and rationalize the many cross-cutting interest dynamics at play within the population? Three possibilities would be parties, interest groups, or social movements, with the former two especially important in the case in consolidated democracies. Scholars who wish to build upon or refine Walter's account might look for evidence about how parties, interest groups, and social movements articulate mass interests in order to produce the kinds of political pressure that ought to be decisive in determining policy choice. Such an analysis would be especially revealing for some of the transitional economies in Eastern Europe in Chapter 7 and in the Asian cases in Chapter 6, where unconsolidated democracies or electoral authoritarian regimes survey the costs and benefits of adjustment.
The extension just proposed looks for political links running from citizens to policymakers. Another way to push Walter's analysis forward would be to look more closely at how policymakers themselves conceptualize the costs that they face. When explaining national policy choices, Walter's analysis makes it appear that policymakers have a good sense of the costs and benefits of various policy options (with the important exception of whether or not financing will work; about that they may be uncertain, and this can lead to implementation delays). Policy choice is almost technocratic. Much recent work in critical political economy would cast a skeptical eye on such an account, suggesting that the nature of a crisis is in the eye of the beholder, and that "objective" costs are themselves subject to political wrangling. There is plenty of room to unpack the policymaking process further in the context of her case analyses, with an eye to perceptions of vulnerability and threat, time horizons, notions of the national interest, central banks versus ministries of trade and industry, and so forth. There is, too, an irony in Walter's account. Policymakers can foresee the implications of various adjustment options, but they appear unable to foresee what kinds of policies would lead to crises in the first place.
A final consideration is political conflict. Adjustments made with an eye towards minimizing costs should be popular, but not universally so, even in cases where costs are straightforward. Distributional politics ought to follow in all of the cases that Walter considers. Further analysis of the "second stage" of adjustment policies-implementation and its aftermath-will shed further light into the ways in which macroeconomic adjustment shapes politics over the medium term. The theoretical model admits a role for the political opposition in affecting the speed and shape of adjustment measures (see e.g. p. 118), and oppositions appear here and there in the case analyses, but focusing on what happens after adjustment will help to characterize the politics of adjustment more fully.
By prompting such questions, Financial Crises and the Politics of Macroeconomic Adjustment shows that there is still much that comparative political economists and others working in cognate fields can do to further our understanding of the Global Financial Crisis and other related crises in recent history. It would be especially interesting to put Walter's contribution into conversation with contributions found in Bermeo and Pontusson (2012) and Streeck and Sch€ afer (2013) , most of which place greater emphasis on ideas such as austerity and the constraints of European economic integration. It is Walter, though, who has set the agenda.
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